Biden v Nebraska (22-506)
ISSUE: Whether the U.S. Department of Education, through its Secretary, has the authority “under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) to establish a student loan forgiveness program that will cancel roughly $430 billion in debt principal and affect nearly all borrowers.”
RULING: No. “The Secretary of [the U.S. Department of] Education does not have authority under the [HEROES ACT] to establish a student loan forgiveness program that will cancel roughly $430 billion in debt principal and affect nearly all borrowers.” – The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Court is reversed and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf
Department of Education v Brown (22-535)
ISSUE: If respondents have standing to sue in this case, whether the “Department [of Education] failed to observe proper procedures in promulgating the Plan.”
RULING: In this case, the SCOTUS instructed lower courts to dismiss the litigation because “[r]espondents [i.e. plaintiffs] lack Article III standing to assert a procedural challenge to the student-loan debt-forgiveness plan adopted by the Secretary of Education pursuant to Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act).” In this case, the plaintiffs/respondents attacked the constitutionality and procedural deficiencies of President Biden’s program, coined the “Biden student loan forgiveness program” (the “Program”). Though the court elected not to decide this case on the merits, the subject matter of the case, the “Program” was disposed on the same day, by the same Court, in Biden v Nebraska, Dkt 22-506; a summary of that case is also included on this page. – The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Court is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court for dismissal.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-535_i3kn.pdf
303 Creative LLC v Elenis (21-476)
ISSUE: Whether the First Amendment permits Colorado to compel a website designer “to create expressive designs speaking messages with which the designer disagrees.”
RULING: No. “The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs speaking messages with which the designer disagrees.” – The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf
Moore v Harper (21-1271)
ISSUE: Whether “[t]he Federal Elections Clause vests exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections.”
RULING: No. “The Federal Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections and [therefore, in this case][] the North Carolina Supreme Court [was not barred] from reviewing the North Carolina Legislature’s congressional districting plans for compliance with North Carolina law.”– The North Carolina Supreme Court is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1271_3f14.pdf
Counterman v Colorado (22-138)
ISSUE: Whether, in a criminal case, the government can establish that a statement is a ‘true threat’ unprotected by the First Amendment, [without proof] that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the statements’ threatening nature, based on a showing no more demanding than recklessness.”
RULING: No. “To establish that a statement is a ‘true threat’ unprotected by the First Amendment, the State must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the statements’ threatening nature, based on a showing no more demanding than recklessness.” – The dismissal issued by the North Carolina Court of Appeals is vacated and remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railroad Co. (21-1168)
ISSUE: Whether a state statute violates Due Process if the statute requires “out-of-state companies that register to do business in [the state] to agree to appear in [the state’s courts] on ‘any cause of action’ against them [].”
RULING: No. “A [state statute] law requiring out-of-state companies that register to do business in [the state] to agree to appear in [the state’s courts] on ‘any cause of action’ against them [is constitutionally permissible and] comports with []Due Process…” – The judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (for the Eastern District) is vacated and remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1168_f2ah.pdf
Groff v DeJoy (22-174)
ISSUE: Whether, “Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation [must prove] that the burden of granting [such an] accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business.”
RULING: Yes. “Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business” – The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is vacated and remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-174_k536.pdf
Arbitron Austria GmbH v Hetronic Int’l, Inc. (21-1043)
ISSUE: Whether the two provisions of the Lanham Act at issue in this case [i.e. 15 U. S. C. §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1)] prohibit trademark infringement where the alleged infringing “use in commerce” occurs outside of the United States borders (e.g. within the boundaries of a foreign nation).
RULING: No. “[The] two provisions of the Lanham Act [at issue in this case] that prohibit trademark infringement—15 U. S. C. §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1)—[] extend only to claims where the infringing ‘use in commerce’ is domestic [i.e. occurring within the United States].” – The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1043_7648.pdf
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (20-1199)
ISSUE: Whether “[t]he admissions programs at Harvard College and the University of North Carolina violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
RULING: Yes. “The admissions programs at Harvard College and the University of North Carolina violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” By this decision, the SCOTUS prohibits the consideration of race as a factor in college admissions, thereby proscribing use of affirmative action in higher education. – The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is reversed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf
US v Hansen (22-179)
ISSUE: Whether “[T]itle 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) – which criminalizes ‘encouraging or inducing’ illegal immigration – [] unconstitutionally overbroad.”
RULING: No. “Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) – which criminalizes ‘encouraging or inducing’ illegal immigration – forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and is not unconstitutionally overbroad [and therefore adheres to Due Process requirements].” – The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-179_o75q.pdf
Coinbase v Bielski (22-105)
ISSUE: Whether “a district court [i.e. the trial court for lawsuits that are filed in federal court] must stay [i.e. pause] its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal [i.e. an appeal of a nonfinal court order during litigation] taken pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §16(a) on the question of arbitrability is ongoing.”
RULING: Yes. “Federal district courts must pause the trial-level litigation while an interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §16(a) on the question of arbitrability is ongoing.” Under specific circumstances, litigants are permitted to appeal court orders issued by trial court judges even though there are still unresolved issues in the case. These types of appeals are known as interlocutory appeals. Courts prefer that parties wait until the entire case is over at the trial level before appealing any order, decision, or judgment of the trial court. – The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-105_5536.pdf
United States v Texas (22-58)
ISSUE: Whether “Texas and Louisiana have Article III standing to challenge immigration-enforcement guidelines promulgated by the Secretary of Homeland Security that prioritize the arrest and removal of certain noncitizens from the United States.”
RULING: No. “Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge immigration-enforcement guidelines promulgated by the Secretary of Homeland Security that prioritize the arrest and removal of certain noncitizens from the United States.” – The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Samia v United States (22-196)
ISSUE: Whether “[t]he Confrontation Clause was violated by the [evidentiary] admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession that did not directly inculpate the defendant…”
RULING: Yes. “The Confrontation Clause was not violated by the [evidentiary] admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession that did not directly inculpate the defendant and was subject to a proper limiting instruction.” In this case, the trial court judge instructed the jury to consider a confession by a non-testifying co-defendant conspirator. The defense attorney objected based on a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses even if the “witness” is not actually present in the courtroom giving verbal testimony. – The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-196_p8k0.pdf
Smith v US (21-1576)
ISSUE: Whether the “Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district.”
RULING: Yes. “The Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district.” – The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Court is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1576_e29g.pdf
Haaland v Brackeen (21-376)
ISSUE: Whether in child custody proceedings governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the ICWA is consistent with Article I authority or is it an unconstitutional form of commandeering prohibited by the Tenth Amendment.
RULING: In child custody proceedings governed by the ICWA, the SCOTUS affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion and, in doing so, ruled the ICWA is consistent with Article I authority. The SCOTUS also determined that the parties to this case lacked standing to litigate their challenges to the ICWA’s placement preferences. – The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-376_7l48.pdf
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v Coughlin (22-227)
ISSUE: Whether “the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governments, including federally recognized Indian Tribes”?
RULING: Yes. “The Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governments, including federally recognized Indian Tribes”?.” – The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-227_i426.pdf
US ex rel. Polansky v Executive Health Resources (21-1052)
ISSUE: Whether, “in a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), the U.S. may move to dismiss [the case] whenever it has intervened [and, if so,] whether in assessing a motion to dismiss an FCA action [by the government] over a relator’s [e.g., whistleblower] objection, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).”
RULING: Yes to both issues. “In a qui tam action under the FCA, the U.S. may move to dismiss whenever it has intervened. In assessing a motion to dismiss an FCA action over a relator’s [e.g., whistleblower] objection, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).” – The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1052_fd9g.pdf
Lora v US (22-49)
ISSUE: Whether “the bar on imposition of concurrent sentences in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) applies to a sentence for a § 924(j) conviction.”
RULING: No. The bar does not apply and a § 924(j) sentence can run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence. – The dismissal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-49_d18e.pdf
Jones v Hendrix (21-857)
ISSUE: Whether the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. §2255(e) “allows a prisoner asserting an intervening change in the interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions by filing a habeas petition under §2241.”
RULING: No. “The savings clause in 28 U.S.C. §2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening change in the interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions by filing a habeas petition under §2241.” – The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Yegiazaryan v Smagin (22-381); and CMB Monaco, FKA Compagnie Monegasque De Banque v Vitaly Ivanovich Smagin et, al. (22-383)
ISSUE: Whether “a plaintiff alleges a domestic injury for purposes of §1964(c) [under the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act] when the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate it arose in the United States.”
RULING: Yes. “A plaintiff alleges a domestic injury for purposes of §1964(c) [under the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act] when the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate it arose in the United States.”– The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-381_d1of.pdf
Arizona v Navajo Nation (21-1484)
ISSUE: Whether “the 1868 Treaty estadblishing the Navajo Reservation [] requires the United States to take affirmative steps to secure water for the tribe.”
RULING: No. “The 1868 Treaty establishing the Navajo Reservation reserved necessary water to accomplish the purpose of the Navajo Reservation but did not require the U.S. to take affirmative steps to secure water for the tribe.” – The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1484_aplc.pdf
Pugin v Garland (22-23); and Garland, Attorney General v Cordero-Garcia (22-331)
ISSUE: Whether, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) definition of aggravated felony, “an offense may ‘relate to‘ obstruction of justice [] even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending.”
RULING: Yes. “An offense may ‘relate to‘ obstruction of justice under the INA definition of aggravated felony even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. – As to Pugin v Garland (22-23), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed; as to Garland v Cordero-Garcia (22-331), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed and remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-23_d18e.pdf
Tyler v Hennepin County, Minnesota (21-166)
ISSUE: Whether the government (in this case, a local county government) is in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause when it seizes the entire value of a person’s real property (e.g., a person’s home), including any equity, to satisfy a smaller debt owed (e.g., unpaid property taxes).
RULING: Yes. The government violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment if it seizes the entire value of a property to satisfy a debt of lesser value on account of the government failing to pay the (former) landowner just compensation. – The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-166_q861.pdf
Sackett v EPA (21-454)
ISSUE: Whether the Clean Water Act (CWA) “extends to wetlands that have no continuous dsurface connections with ‘waters’ of the United States?” And, whether the lower court properly interpreted the meaning of “waters of the United States,” under the CWA.
RULING: No. The ruling limits the scope of the CWA. “The CWA’s use of ‘waters’ refers only to geographic[al] features that are described in ordinary parlance as streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes and to adjacent wetlands that are indistinguishable from those bodies of water due to a continuous surface connection…[t]o assert jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland under the CWA, a party must establish first, that the adjacent [body of water constitutes] . . . water[s] of the United States (i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the water ends and the wetland begins.”– The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-454_4g15.pdf
Dupree v Younger (22-210)
ISSUE: Whether “a post-trial motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 50 is required to preserve for appellate review a purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment.”
RULING: No. “A post-trial motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 50 is not required to preserve for appellate review a purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment.” – The dismissal issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the case remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-210_7mi8.pdf
Calcutt v FDIC (22-714)
ISSUE: In an FDIC enforcement action against a former CEO of a Michigan-based community bank accused of “mismanaging one of the bank’s loan relationships in the wake of the ‘Great Recession’ of 2007–2009,” the question presented is whether the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals appropriately resolved a case, in substance, that had come up to the Sixth Circuit following the appeal of a flawed adjudication by an administrative law body when the Sixth Circuit determined the adjudicating body had committed errors.
RULING: No. The Sixth Circuit erred by issuing a decision rather than remanding the case back to the adjudicating body in order for the administrative body to correct its errors. – The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed [per curiam opinion].
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-714_4315.pdf
Amgen Inc., et al. v Sanofi, et al. (21-757)
ISSUE: Whether Amgen’s patents are valid under §112 of the Patent Act. “That provision requires a patent applicant to describe its invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the [invention].”
RULING: No. Amgen’s two patents, at issue, are invalid because Amgen “failed ‘to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the [invention]’.” – The Federal Circuit is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-757_2d8f.pdf
Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts, Inc. (AWF) v Goldsmith (21-869)
ISSUE: This case involves the “fair use” doctrine as a defense to copyright infringement. There are four “fair use” factors. This case involves only one. The question before the Court was: “[w]hether the first fair use factor, ‘the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,’ §107(1), weighs in favor of AWF’s recent commercial licensing to Condé Nast.”
RULING: No. “The ‘purpose and character’ of AWF’s use of Goldsmith’s photograph in commercially licensing Orange Prince to Condé Nast does not favor AWF’s fair use defense to copyright infringement.” – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-869_87ad.pdf
Ohio Adjunct General’s Department, et al. v Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) (21-1454)
ISSUE: “Whether the FLRA properly exercised jurisdiction over an unfair labor practices dispute [as governed by] the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS or Statute), [considering] the FLRA only has jurisdiction over labor organizations and federal ‘agencies’.”
RULING: Yes. “The FLRA had jurisdiction over this labor dispute because a State National Guard acts as a federal agency for purposes of the FSLMRS when it hires and supervises dual-status technicians serving in their civilian role.” – The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1454_6kgm.pdf
Polselli v IRS (No. 21-1599)
ISSUE: Whether the IRS is required to provide notice to a taxpayer under investigation anytime the IRS issues a summons, including when the IRS serves a summons to a third party during its “collection phase,” i.e., post liability determination of the IRS’ investigative process.
RULING: No. “To safeguard privacy, the IRS is generally required to provide notice to anyone named in a summons, who can then sue to quash it…[this] case concerns an exception to that general rule…When the IRS conducts an investigation for the purpose of ‘determining the liability’ of a taxpayer, §7602(a), it must provide notice, §7609(a)(1). But once the Service has reached the stage of ‘collecting any such liability,’ §7602(a)—which is a distinct activity—notice may not be required, §7609(c)(2)(D).” – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1599_l5gm.pdf
National Pork Producers Council, et al. v. Ross, Secretary of the California Dept. of Food and Agriculture (21-468)
ISSUE: Whether a California law known as Proposition 12 is valid if the law forbids the in-state sale of “whole pork meat that comes from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are ‘confined in a cruel manner’.”
RULING: Yes, the law is valid. The law, at issue, does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce and, the trial court’s dismissal (affirmed by the Ninth Circuit) due to a finding that the complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law. – The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed [plurality opinion].
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-468_c0ne.pdf
Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (22-96)
ISSUE: Whether the text of the “Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA),” a 2016 law providing “a system for overseeing Puerto Rico’s finances, while also enabling the Commonwealth to gain bankruptcy protections similar to those available under the Federal Bankruptcy Code…makes Congress’s intent to abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity unmistakably clear.”
RULING: No. “Nothing in PROMESA—including its jurisdictional provision, Section 2126(a)—categorically abrogates any sovereign immunity the Board enjoys from legal claims. This Court assumes without deciding that Puerto Rico is immune from suit in United States district court, and that the Board partakes of that immunity.” – The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is reversed and remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-96_6j7a.pdf
MOAC Mall Holdings, Inc. v Transform Holdco LLC (21-1270)
ISSUE: “[w]hether 11 U. S. C. § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code is jurisdictional—arises in the context of [a] Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Sears, Roebuck and Co…[11 U. S. C. § 363(m)] states that ‘[t]he reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under [§ 363(b) or § 363(c)] of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith. . .unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.”
RULING: No. “Section 363(m) is not a jurisdictional provision.” – The judgment issued by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/598us1r14_3e04.pdf
New York v New Jersey, 598 U.S. 218 (2023) – original jurisdiction resides with SCOTUS
ISSUE: Whether “New Jersey may unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact notwithstanding New York’s opposition.”
RULING: Yes. “New Jersey may unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact notwithstanding New York’s opposition…[u]nlike certain other compacts, the Compact here does not address withdrawal.” – SCOTUS grants New Jersey’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denies New York’s cross-motion.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/598us1r11_ca7d.pdf
Axon Enterprise, Inc. v FTC (21-86)
SEC v Cochran (21-1239)
ISSUE: Whether, with respect to these cases (Axon and Cochran) and others that are initially adjudicated by way of an administrative fair hearing, “[t]he statutory review schemes set out in the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Trade Commission Act do not displace a district court’s federal-question jurisdiction over claims challenging as unconstitutional the structure or existence of the SEC or FTC.
RULING: No. Categories of cases that are initially adjudicated by way of administrative law hearings will, instead, fall under the district court’s jurisdiction provided the federal-question challenges as unconstitutional, the structure or existence of the SEC or FTC – The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed and remanded; the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed and remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/598us1r10_febh.pdf
Wilkens v. United States (21-1164)
ISSUE: Whether landowners who bring suit against the government to Quiet Title based on dueling interpretations of an easement held in favor of the government are time-barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(g) which permits the landowner to bring suit within 12 years from the date the landowner knows or should know that his land is encumbered.
RULING: No. Filing deadlines will not divest a court of jurisdiction. In this case SCOUTS concludes that the 12-year time frame set forth in the statute is for timeliness purposes only and does not impact whether a court retains jurisdiction over the dispute and parties, stating, “28 U. S. C. § 2409a(g) “is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule” and thus the time constraint set forth in the statute is not a statute of limitation barring suit. – The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed and remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/598us1r9_8mjp.pdf
Luna Perez v Sturgis Public Schools, et al. (21-887)
ISSUE: Assuming the matter is governed by both the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),whether a litigant must exhaust all administrative rights under the IDEA prior to initiating litigation under the ADA if the relief sought in the ADA lawsuit is not available under the IDEA.
RULING: No. A litigant is not required to exhaust all administrative rights before bringing a suit under the ADA as long as the type of relief sought in the ADA lawsuit is not the same type of relief that is available under the IDEA. On the other hand, “[the] IDEA’s exhaustion requirement does not preclude an ADA lawsuit if the relief [sought] (i. e., compensatory damages) is not something IDEA can provide.” – The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed and remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/598us1r8_limq.pdf
Twitter, Inc. v Taamneh (21-1496)
ISSUE: Whether Plaintiff’s allegations that the social media company defendants aided and abetted ISIS in its terrorist attack at a nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey are sufficient to state a claim suitable for litigation under 18 USC § 2333(d)(2) which “imposes civil liability on ‘any person
who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism’.”
RULING: No. “Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to establish that these defendants aided and abetted ISIS in carrying out the relevant attack.” – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1496_d18f.pdf
NOTE: Today, the SCOTUS remanded Gonzalez v Google (21-1333) back to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “for reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision in Twitter v Taamneh (21-149).” America’s Future submitted an Amicus Brief in Gonzalez. Read more about our Amicus brief here.
Reed v Goertz (21-442)
ISSUE: Whether the statute of limitations on a §1983 denial of due process claim begins to run at the end of a criminal trial or after appeals are exhausted.
RULING: It depends. When a prisoner pursues state post-conviction DNA testing through the state-provided litigation process, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 procedural due process claim begins to run when the state litigation ends, in this case when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Reed’s motion for rehearing.” According to SCOTUS, the statute begins to run when the “state’s alleged failure to provide a fundamentally fair process is complete.” – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/598us1r12_6579.pdf
Percoco v US (21-1158)
ISSUE: “Whether a private citizen with influence over government decision-making can be convicted for wire fraud on the theory that he or she deprived the public of its ‘intangible right of honest services [under 18 U. S. C. §§1343, 1346]’.”
RULING: Generally no, but no bright-line rule in this case. Although reversed on different grounds, SCOTUS, in dicta, reveals, “We reject the argument that a person nominally outside public employment can never have the necessary fiduciary duty to the public…however…’[t]he intangible right of honest services’ codified in §1346 plainly does not extend a duty to the public to all private persons.” – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1158_p8k0.pdf
NOTE: America’s Future published an article related to Percoco on November 10, 2022. You can read it here.
Ciminelli v US (No. 21-1170)
ISSUE: “Whether the Second Circuit’s longstanding ‘right to control’ theory of fraud describes a valid basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute, which criminalizes the use of interstate wires for ‘any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.’ 18 U. S. C. §1343.” SCOTUS notes “[u]nder the right-to-control theory, a defendant is guilty of wire fraud if he schemes to deprive the victim of ‘potentially valuable economic information’ ‘necessary to make discretionary economic decisions’.”
RULING: No. “The federal fraud statutes criminalize only schemes to deprive people of traditional property interests. Because ‘potentially valuable economic information’ ‘necessary to make discretionary economic decisions’ is not a traditional property interest, we now hold that the right-to-control theory is not a valid basis for liability under §1343.” – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1170_b97d.pdf
Santos-Zacaria AKA Santos-Sacarias v Garland (21-1436)
ISSUE: Whether, “under 8 U. S. C. §1252(d)(1), a noncitizen who seeks to challenge an [Administrative adjudicatory] order of removal in court must first exhaust certain administrative remedies [8 U. S. C. §1252(d)(1) provides: ‘A court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right’].”
RULING: No. SCOTUS indicates the statutory provision under review in this case “lacks the clear statement necessary to qualify as jurisdictional.” Further, statutory provisions that are jurisdictional can have harsh consequences and, therefore, courts should treat statutes or provisions as jurisdictional only if “Congress clearly states that it is.” This is because the question of jurisdiction can divest a court of authority over a case which can be a harsh consequence.
Here, SCOTUS determined that 8 U.S.C.§1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, and therefore “a noncitizen need not request discretionary forms of administrative review, like reconsideration [of an unfavorable Administrative Fair Hearing Appeals determination, in order to seek court intervention].” – The Dismissal issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is vacated, in part, and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1436_n6io.pdf
Arellano v McDonough (No. 21-432)
ISSUE: Whether entitlement to certain Veterans Affairs disability benefits is subject to equitable tolling permitting an untimely application or appeal for such benefits to be reviewed and adjudicated on the merits of the application or appeal.
RULING: No. Entitlement to certain Veterans Affairs disability benefits “is not subject to equitable tolling. Equitable tolling ‘effectively extends an otherwise discrete limitations period set by Congress’ when a litigant diligently pursues his rights but extraordinary circumstances prevent him from bringing a timely action.” – Affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-432_f2bh.pdf
In Re Grand Jury (No. 21-1397)
ISSUE: Not Applicaable
RULING: Dismissed as improvidently granted.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1397_ap6b.pdf
Cruz v Arizona (No. 21-864)
ISSUE: Whether the highest courts in states may dismiss an appeal involving a criminal defendant’s constitutionally protected post-conviction relief claim(s) based on a novel and unforeseeable application of binding precedence interpreting a state court procedural rule.
RULING: No. A holding out of the highest court in any state that is based on a novel and unforeseeable application of precedence and interpretation of state procedural law is not adequate to foreclose review of the constitutional claim – Vacated the Ariz Supreme Court dismissal and remanded to the same court for further proceedings.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-846_lkgn.pdf
Helix Energy Solutions Group v Hewitt (No. 21-984)
ISSUE: Whether a “daily-rate worker,” of whatever income level, qualifies as a salaried employee and therefore exempt from Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA’s) overtime pay guarantee.
RULING: Generally, no. “Daily-rate workers, of whatever income level, qualify as paid on a salary basis only if [certain] conditions [set out in §541.604(b)] are met.” – Affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-984_j426.pdf
Bartenwerfer v Buckley (No. 21-908)
ISSUE: Whether the Bankruptcy Code “precludes discharging, in bankruptcy, a debt obtained by fraud, regardless [of the debtor’s] own culpability.”
RULING: No. “Section 523(a)(2)(A) [of the Bankruptcy Code] precludes discharging, in bankruptcy, a debt obtained by fraud, regardless [of the debtor’s] own culpability” – Affirmed The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-908_n6io.pdf
Bittner v US (No. 21-1195)
ISSUE: Whether the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) “$10,000 maximum penalty for the nonwillful failure to file a compliant report accrues on a per-account, basis.”
RULING: No. “The BSA’s $10,000 maximum penalty for the nonwillful failure to file a compliant report accrues on a per-report, not a per-account, basis” – Reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1195_h3ci.pdf
Delaware v Pennsylvania (No. 21-145)
ISSUE: Whether “Agent Checks” and Teller’s Checks (collectively, “Disputed Instruments”) are sufficiently “similar” to a money and therefore can be escheated by states under the Federal Disposition Act (FDA).
RULING: Yes. “The Disputed Instruments are sufficiently ‘similar’ to a money order to fall within the FDA” – In this case, the SCOTUS directed, as follows: “Exceptions to Special Master’s First Interim Report overruled; First Interim Report and order adopted to the extent consistent with this opinion; and cases remanded.”
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/145orig_kjfl.pdf
Slack Technologies, LLC v Pirani (22-200)
ISSUE: “[What] a public buyer [of a public offering] must allege to state a claim under §11 [of the Securities Act of 1933]”
RULING: “Section 11 of the 1933 [Securities] Act requires a plaintiff to plead and prove that he purchased securities registered under a materially misleading registration statement. The relevant language of §11(a) authorizes an individual to sue for a material misstatement or omission in a registration statement when the individual has acquired ‘such security’.” – The dismissal issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-200_097c.pdf
Glacier Northwest, Inc. v Teamsters (21-1449)
ISSUE: Whether the NLRA preempts tort claims alleging that a defendant Union intentionally destroyed the company’s property during a labor dispute.”
RULING: No. “The NLRA did not preempt the tort claims alleging that the [defendant] Union intentionally destroyed the company’s property during a labor dispute.” – The Supreme Court of Washington is reversed, and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1449_d9eh.pdf
US, et al., ex rel., Schutte, et al. v Supervalu inc., et al. (21-1326)
ISSUE: Whether the False Claims Act (FCA) “scienter element refers to a defendant’s knowledge and subjective beliefs—not to what an objectively reasonable person may have known or believed.” – The dismissal issued by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded.
RULING: Yes. The FCA’s “scienter element refers to a defendant’s knowledge and subjective beliefs—not to what an objectively reasonable person may have known or believed.”
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1326_6jfl.pdf
Allen, Alabama Secretary of State v Milligan (21-1086)
ISSUE: “[W]hether the districting plan adopted by the State of Alabama for its 2022 congressional elections likely violated §2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U. S. C. §10301.”
RULING: “The Court affirms the District Court’s determination that plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on their claim that HB1 violates §2 [of the Voting Rights Act].”
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Dubin v US (22-10)
ISSUE: Whether a person “convicted of healthcare fraud under 18 U. S. C. §1347 [] also committed “[a]ggravated identity theft” under [18 U.S.C.] §1028A(a)(1).”
RULING: It depends. “Section Under §1028A(a)(1), a defendant ‘uses’ another person’s means of identification ‘in relation to’ a predicate offense when the use is at the crux of what makes the conduct criminal.” – The dismissal issued by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-10_ifjn.pdf
Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v VIP Products, LLC (22-148)
ISSUE: “Whether the defendant’s use of a mark is ‘likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive’ [or] whether the defendant ‘harm[ed] the reputation” of a famous trademark’.”
RULING: Trademark infringement occurs when the infringer “has used a trademark to designate the source of its own goods—in other words, has used a trademark as a trademark. That kind of use falls within the heartland of trademark law, and does not receive special First Amendment protection…[t]he use of a mark does not count as noncommercial just because it parodies, or otherwise comments on, another’s products.”- The dismissal issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-148_3e04.pdf
Health and Hospital Corp of Marion City v Talevski (21-806)
ISSUE: Whether the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA) “provisions at issue unambiguously create §1983-enforceable rights, and the Court discerns no incompatibility between private enforcement under §1983 and the remedial scheme that Congress devised.”
RULING: Yes. “The FNHRA provisions at issue unambiguously create §1983-enforceable rights, and the Court discerns no incompatibility between private enforcement under §1983 and the remedial scheme that Congress devised.” – The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.
LINK TO OPINION: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
