In a stunning ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has prohibited a city council from allowing mention of Jesus during its invocations. Joyner v. Forsyth County, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15670 (4th Cir. July 29, 2011) The Court interpreted the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as requiring censorship of references to Jesus in prayers allowed by public officials. On December 17, 2007, the invocation at the Forsyth County Board of Commissioners in North Carolina ended with the unremarkable phrase, "For we do make this prayer in Your Son Jesus' name, Amen." The invocation also referenced "the Cross of Calvary," the "Virgin Birth," and the "gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ."

In ruling against the County Board, the appellate court complained that between May 29, 2007 and December 15, 2008, nearly 80% of the prayers referred to "Jesus," "Jesus Christ," "Christ," or "Savior."

The Court further criticized the County Board because most (not all) of the prayers ended with a reference to Jesus, using phrases such as "This we pray, in the gracious name of the Lord Jesus Christ," "[I]n Jesus name we pray," and "In the name of Jesus Christ, our Savior."

The Court found a problem with the fact that none of the prayers at the County Board mentioned any "non-Christian deities." Since the prayers were typically offered by local Christian ministers, it would have been odd, indeed, for one of them to include Buddha or Allah!

The Court cited the increased diversity of the American population as a basis for allowing merely two people, aided by the local ACLU, to censor speech acceptable to hundreds of thousands in the community. Further irony was added by how the Court scrutinized the tiniest details of invocations. Are court-controlled invocations a separation of church and state?

Judge Paul Victor Niemeyer, who was elevated to the appellate court by the first President Bush, wrote a compelling dissent. "The majority's decree commands that every legislative prayer reference only 'God' or some 'nonsectarian ideal,' supposedly because other appellations might offend." Note his use of the word "supposedly"; does someone who claims to be offended by religion also avoid traveling to towns named after saints (e.g., St. Petersburg) and refuse to be helped by any religious-affiliated hospitals? Even if someone were genuinely offended by a reference to Jesus in an invocation, how could such offense possibly justify censorship? Nothing in the First Amendment or anywhere else in the Constitution makes being offended a license for someone to censor many others.

Judge Niemeyer concluded his dissent by observing, "The ruling today intermeddles most subjectively without a religiously sensitive or constitutionally compelled standard. This surely cannot be a law for mutual accommodation, and it surely is not required by the Establishment Clause."